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Indexing term: Public key cryptography
The author proposes digital signature schemes without using a one-way function to sign DEie-Hellman public keys. The advantage of this approach is, instead of relying overall security on either the security of the signature scheme or the security of the one-way function, the security of this proposed scheme is based on the discrete logarithm problem.
Introduction: A one-way function is needed in any digital signature scheme. Without using a secure one-way function, a digital signature can be easily forged [l, 21. There are some well-known oneway hash functions, such as the MD4, MD5, SHA, etc. There exists a major difference of security assumptions between digital signature schemes and one-way functions. The security assumptions of most signature schemes are based on some well-known computational problems, such as the discrete logarithm problem, the factoring problem, etc. However, the security of most one-way hash functions is based on the complexity of analysing an iterated simple function. Since most computational problems are wellknown and easy to understand, the security of most signature schemes can withstand quite a long period of time. However, a one-way function may seem very difficult to analyse at the beginning; but it may turn out to be vulnerable to some special attacks later. Thus, in general, the lifetime of one-way functions is shorter than that of signature schemes. For example, recent advancement of cryptanalysis research has found that MD5 is 'at the edge' of risking successful cryptanalytic attack [3] . There are two motivations of proposing signature schemes without using a one-way function. First, instead of relying overall security on the weaker assumption between the signature scheme and the one-way function, the security of our proposed schemes is based on the discrete logarithm problem. Secondly, the overall security can be easily understood and analysed.
Diffie and Hellman [4] proposed the well-known public-key distribution scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem in 1976 to enable two parties to establish a common secret session key based on their exchanged public keys. But their original scheme can only share one common secret key and did not provide authentication for the exchanged public keys. Since them, several key exchange protocols [5, 61 to allow two parties to share multiple secret session keys have been proposed based on the DiffieHellman public-key technique. In general, these protocols utilise a digital signature for each distributed public key to provide authentication. Since Diffie-Hellman's public key is obtained by computing an exponential function over GFb) and the exponential function itself is a well-known one-way function, we propose signature schemes without using any additional one-way function for signing Diffie-Hellman public keys. In addition, since the DiffieHellman public key is a random number, our proposed schemes are not suitable for signing any given message. A signature scheme uses a fuced secret key to sign a message and a verifier uses a signer's fuced public key to verify the signature of a message. In this proposed signature scheme, the message itself is a random Diffie-Hellman public key r = ak mod p E [ 1, p 11 computed by the signer, where k is a secret random integer k E 
In the following, we will discuss the general form of the above signature equation to satisfy security considerations. (i) Since x and k are two secret numbers and the verifier does not know these two values, x and k should be treated as in different terms in the above equation. Otherwise, if we combine these two secret parameters together (i.e. for example, if xk = r f s mod 0@), then y" = ar+s mod p or ri = a'+' mod pj, the verifier cannot verify the signature. (iij To claim that s is a signature for the random public key r, the random public key r should be included in the signature equation and can be included in any parameter of (a, b, c).
(iii) To provide a digital signature, s should also be included in any parameter of (a, b, c) . Thus, there are four parameters, (x, k, r, s), in the equation. eters, (r, sj, are public information. But, x is the fixed secret key of the signer and k is a random secret value for each random public key. Since the number of secret parameters is always one larger than the number of linear equations available to the attacker, the signature scheme is secure based on the discussion in the original ElGamal paper. We list all possible signature variations in Table 1 . (ij Among all signature schemes we have listed in Table 1 , the signature generation only requires us to solve a linear equation. The signature verification requires two modular exponentiations. In schemes (i) and (iii), the signature s can be solved without computing the inverse. More important than the efficiency is that these signature schemes are not relied on any one-way hash function.
(iij The techniques used in the DSA [7] and the Schnorr scheme [SI can also be applied to all schemes in the table to shorten the signature and to speed up computation. Optimum source-to-channel assignment A.K. Khandani
Indexing tew" Channel coding, Source coding
The problem of the optimum assignment of a set of source symbols to a set of channel symbols is expressed in terms of a quadratic assignment problem (QAP). Numerical examples are presented for the assignment of a scalar quantiser to a binary channel.
Consider a communication system aimed at transmitting a source S through a channel C. The source S has T symbols, s,, i = 0, ___, T-1, where s, occurs with probability P,(ij. The distortion between s,, s, E S is equal to Dp(i,j). The channel C has T symbols c,,
..., T-1. The probability of receiving a channel symbol j conditioned on transmitting a channel symbol i is equal to: Pc(j i). The objective is to select a one-to-one mapping 5 between the set of the source symbols and the set of the channel symbols to minimise the end-to-end average distortion, namely
We assign a T dimensional binary vector to each symbol of the source at the channel input. The vector corresponding to the ith symbol is composed of the elements: [x,,, j = 0, ..., T-11. If the ith source symbol is assigned to the Ith channel symbol, we set xrl = 1 for j = 1 and xtl = 0 for j # 1. Using these notations, the assignmemt problem is formulated as
T-I - known to be NP-hard and are generally very difficult to solve. The exact solution methods are mainly based on either finding an integer programming formulation for the problem or using the method of the branch and bound. There are also numerous works discussing different heuristic approaches to approximate the optimum solution [3, 41 . Tables 1 and 2 contain numerical results for the optimum assignment of the levels of a scalar Max quantiser [5] to the symbols of a binary channel. The distortion measure is the mean square distance. The corresponding QAP is solved using the branch and bound algorithm. A supplementary technique (known as reduction) is used which allows us to decompose the objective function of the QAP as the sum of a linear term and a quadratic term. The main strategy in computing lower bounds for a QAP (as required in the branch and bound method) is based on minimising the linear term and replacing the quadratic term by a lower bound
